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ABSTRACT 
This thesis project explores two approaches for military tactical wireless communications 
solutions in the context of being useful for the Swedish Armed Forces. The study’s 
tactical perspective focuses on a force of battalion size. The two network approaches, ad 
hoc networking and infrastructure based, were analyzed and compared via simulation. As 
a baseline for this thesis project, research was initiated based on appropriate 
communication requirements for the tactical force. This was followed by background 
research into current technologies for ad hoc networking and infrastructure-based 
systems. In order to analyze and compare the two technology approaches, a model was 
developed using the software Joint Communication Simulation System (JCSS) and a 
battalion-sized network simulation using ad hoc and infrastructure-based technology.  
This thesis project addressed tactical force requirements from the perspective of 
the basic Swedish Armed Forces principle for command and control, which is Maneuver 
Warfare. Evaluation of the technologies is discussed through the important perspectives 
of capacity, mobility, flexibility, robustness, interoperability, and cost. By analyzing the 
technology approaches from these perspectives, this thesis project attempts to provide the 
Swedish Armed Forces with more information and understanding, which in-turn will 
allow better-suited future developments of all tactical wireless communication systems.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND TO WIRELESS COMMUNICATION 
Mobile systems for radio communication were first used in the early years of the 
twentieth century. When radio systems were installed in tanks during WWII, the ability 
for these forces to maneuver increased vastly. The armored units could now act fast and 
with precision, and the commander could lead his force by using real-time 
communication systems. In the early days, the available technology provided only 
analogue communication with a very limited level of service. Digitization matured the 
development for radio communications one step further. Digital communications 
technology made it possible to not only increase the amount of information that could be 
transferred, but also expand the kinds of information transmitted between two points. 
Initially, only voice and text could be transferred; with digital communication, however, 
it became possible to transfer pictures and video. Today’s battlefield environment 
requires extensive and flexible capabilities for our fighting forces. Our battle space also 
requires sharing information between units and soldiers in very short time durations. The 
need to share information also goes beyond various services. In order to conduct joint 
operations, it is important for our communications infrastructure to have high 
interoperability so that units from one service can readily communicate with units from 
other services. The ongoing development for radio communications capabilities has 
evolved to create ad hoc networks where every radio acts as a node of a larger system. 
These nodes autonomously communicate and keep track of each other. If you want to 
communicate with a unit that is located far away from your current position, you must 
use many nodes between the two units in order to get the message through to the distant 
destination. An ad hoc system is a peer-to-peer configuration (no centralized server), 
which is extremely important because it allows military nodes and systems to be set up 
temporarily to meet an immediate need [1].  
The extensive civilian development for wireless communication is another 
dimension that must be taken into consideration in the future development of military 
wireless communication. Substantial sums of money and resources are used in the 
 2
ongoing projects for systems ultimately intended to be used strictly for military tactical 
communications. At the same time, civilian communication technology can be expected 
to provide critical hardware and software that must be used for military purposes as well. 
On the commercial side, GSM was the first digital technology, and it was followed by 
UMTS/3G. In some countries, the next generation 4G/LTE have already been released. 
This infrastructure-based technology is an alternative, or at a minimum a backup, to 
military systems providing military mission capabilities and using software radios in an 
ad hoc network.  
B. ONGOING DEVELOPMENT FOR MILITARY RADIO 
COMMUNICATION 
1.  Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) 
The solution that the United States has chosen to meet future requirements for 
military radio communication is the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) project, begun in 
1997. The Department of Defense initiated the JTRS program in order to develop a 
family of software programmable tactical radios that would provide deployed military 
forces required voice, data and video communications support. This early JTRS design 
was titled Programmable, Modular Communications System (PMCS), and was intended 
to replace older hardware-intensive radios with software applications in order to support 
military operations over a wide range of systems, from Army units to airplanes and ships 
[2]. JTRS was restructured in 2005, falling under the leadership of a Joint Program 
Executive Officer with headquarter in San Diego, California. The identified goal for 
JTRS is to develop a family of interoperable, modular, software radios. The scope of the 
JTRS program is to be able to operate in ad hoc wireless networks and provide service for 
mobile and fixed forces that consist of U.S. joint forces, allies, coalition partners and 
disaster response personnel [3].  
The family of software-defined JTRS radios was eventually divided into sub-
programs. Initially, these sub-programs were named clusters, but were later renamed into 
function-oriented names. The sub-programs were defined as follows:  
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Figure 1.   Example of hardware within JTRS (From [3]) 
JTRS Ground Mobile Radio (JTRS GMR), previously called Cluster 1 
 
The sub-program JTRS Ground Mobile Radio is Army-led and focused to 
develop vehicle mounted radios for the Army and the Marine corps. The 
company Boeing helped develop the GMR program and they are now in 
the formal testing period. The JTRS GMR will be installed in U.S. Army 
vehicles such as Abrams, Bradley and High Mobility Multipurpose 
Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV:s) [4]. The Wideband Networking 
Waveform (WNW) and the JTRS SINCGARS are waveforms that have 
been developed for JTRS GMR.  
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JTRS Multiband Inter/Intra Team Radio (JTRS MBITR), previously 
called Cluster 2 
 
The sub-program JTRS MBITR is led by the U.S. Special Operations 
Command.  The company Thales is the prime contractor for JTRS MBITR 
and the product name of their radio is AN/PRC-148 JEM (JTRS Enhanced 
MBITR) which is the first approved JTRS product. AN/PRC-148 is a 
handheld software-defined radio that is capable of operating with a various 
range of modulations and waveforms such as ANDVT, HAVEQUICK 
I/II, and SINCGARS [2]. 
 
JTRS Airborne, Maritime Fixed-Station (JTRS AMF), previously called 
Cluster 3 and 4 
 
JTRS AMF initially consisted of two programs, the Navy-led Cluster 3 
and the Air Force-led Cluster 4. The sub-program JTRS AMF is intended 
to modernize the communications system in the U. S. military fixed and 
rotary wing aircraft, ground installations and wide range of U.S. Navy 
ships [5]. 
 
Within the JTRS program, there is also a sub-program called 
Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS). MIDS aims to 
develop a software-defined radio that will be the second generation of 
Link 16 (a high-capacity, jam-resistant, secure data link providing detailed 
interoperability and situational-awareness tactical information on air, land, 
surface and subsurface points of interest). The MIDS JTRS terminals will 
provide a solution for fighter aircraft, command and control centers, and 
ships [6].  
 
 5
JTRS Handheld, Manpack, Small Form Fit (JTRS HMS), previously  
called Cluster 5 
 
The U.S. Army-led sub-program JTRS HMS focuses primarily on the 
small form factor (SFF) radio requirements of future land forces. This 
radio will not be used only for communications within combat forces; it 
will also be used for communication with and between sensors like 
Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS), Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), 
Unattended Ground Vehicles (UGV) and Intelligent Munitions.  
 
The sub-programs JTRS GMR and JTRS HMS have entered the 
government testing phase. During 2010 and 2011, the system will go 
through a series of tests before being fully approved for use in the field 
[7].  
2. The Swedish Project, GTRS 
Sweden has started a JTRS-similar project for future tactical radio 
communication, named GTRS. From the Swedish perspective, the GTRS project is 
planned to be the base for the core system for all future radio communication in the 
Swedish Armed Forces (SwAF). Since the beginning of 2000, there has been a 
cooperative project between the SwAF and JTRS JPO in San Diego. An important part of 
this cooperative project is to share knowledge when developing new waveforms. On the 
hardware side, GTRS cooperates in many of the sub-programs within JTRS in order to 
follow the development in all the services, land, sea and air. An important intention of 
this cooperation with the JTRS program and the development of Software-Defined 




Figure 2.   GTRS (From [8]) 
C. THE PROBLEM 
1.  Area of Research 
The ongoing development for future tactical wireless communications for the 
Swedish Armed Forces has focused on software-defined radio SDR and networking 
technologies. Parallel to the development of military systems, there has been a massive 
development of civilian wireless communications systems. The civilian systems are most 
often based on some existing infrastructure. These infrastructure-based systems could be 
an alternative to ad hoc networking systems based on software-defined radios.  
This thesis focuses on comparing ad hoc networking systems with modern 
infrastructure-based systems in order to determine which will be the best technology for 
future tactical communications systems for the Swedish Armed Forces.  
2. Research Questions 
Primary question: 
– From a Swedish perspective, what are the key success factors for a tactical 





– What are the key requirements for a tactical communications system? 
– How does ad hoc networking compare to civilian infrastructure-based 
technologies? 
– What recommendations from this study can be provided to the Swedish Armed 
Forces for developing wireless communications systems beyond the ongoing Software 
Defined Radio Program (GTRS)?  
3. Methodology 
The thesis project begins by examining what requirements the Swedish Armed 
Forces have for their tactical communications systems.  In this initial part of the thesis, an 
analysis of the Swedish Armed Forces is conducted from an operational perspective. A 
further analysis of the structure for the command and control, together with past problem 
areas, leads to what the key operational factors/requirements are for future tactical 
communication systems.    
In the next step of the thesis project, research is conducted in the today’s 
technologies for wireless communications, including an investigation into the technology 
for an ad hoc network, which is the focus area for many of today’s military tactical 
solutions. Parallel to the ad hoc networking technology, assessments are made of the 
technologies used for civilian wireless communications, such as 3G, 4G and LTE.  
As a follow-up step in the thesis project, various technologies are analyzed. The 
ad hoc networking technologies and the civilian infrastructure-based technologies are 
compared against the key operational requirements that were found in the discovery 
portion of the earlier thesis project work. In order to analyze the different technologies, 
modern simulation software tools are used.  
Finally, the results from the analysis of the different technologies are evaluated in 
order to determine which technology best meets the overall requirements. The results of 
the thesis project are discussed and summarized in order to make recommendations to the 




Figure 3.   Method 
4.  Scope 
This thesis focuses on studying today’s existing and emerging technologies for 
tactical wireless communications in order to determine which technology will best satisfy 
requirements for the Swedish Armed Forces participating in future land-based operations.  
Concerning the analysis of the Swedish Armed Forces requirements for tactical 
wireless communication, a study was conducted into relevant national doctrinal, strategic 
and operational, documents. The documents associated with the requirement for 
procuring radio equipment for GTRS were analyzed. This initial literature-based analysis 
provides a solid foundation for the stated purpose of the thesis project. The conclusions 
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part of the governing document review provides important key factors that are used as 
variables in the analysis of different technologies in the thesis project.  
The thesis is limited to the study of tactical communications system for land-
based operations, as this is the focus for ongoing and future international peace support 
operations where the Swedish Armed Forces participate.  
For the analysis of different civilian technologies for wireless communication 
parallel to the military ad hoc networking, the focus will be on 3G and 4G. This 
perspective is chosen because these technologies are the most operationally relevant in 
relation to a time period from now to five to ten years from now. An effort is made to 
look into future technologies beyond 3G and 4G, but with an understanding that these 
technologies have not been in use long enough to ensure that the information on these 
systems is the most relevant. Future technologies like LTE, which is beyond today’s 
operating technologies, are discussed in the evaluation part of the thesis.  
In the analysis of technologies, a simulation software tool is used to measure 
efficiency in the different technologies. For these simulations, the software Joint 
Communications Simulation System (JCSS) is used. JCSS is based on OPNET, which is 
recognized as a well-known and accepted tool for planning communication networks. 
JCSS is an application that is used within the United States Armed Forces.  
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II. THE SWEDISH ARMED FORCES IN OPERATIONS 
A. BACKGROUND 
Before 1989 and the fall of the Berlin Wall, Sweden was politically and militarily 
placed between the two major alliances in the world: the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact (WP). Sweden declared itself as a neutral 
country and chose not to be a member of either of these alliances. The focus in Sweden’s 
military strategy was homeland defense. In order to maintain good communications with 
other countries, Sweden has always placed great value in the work of the United Nations. 
As a member of the United Nations, Sweden has tried to work for peace and democracy 
building.  In the time period between World War II and up until 1989, Sweden, in the 
framework of the United Nations, participated in some international operations (i.e., in 
Africa and on Cyprus), but Sweden’s main focus remained on homeland defense. This 
neutral status created an environment where Sweden became isolated from the rest of the 
world. Sweden could, of course, follow other countries’ developments in tactics, 
doctrines and technology, but it was important for Sweden to have self-sustainability. All 
military equipment developed for the Swedish Armed Forces should also be used 
extensively domestically, and, therefore, little effort was put into interoperability 
requirements with other nations’ armed forces. A positive spillover effect of dual-use 
technology, as described, was that it created a strong domestic defense industry with 
several companies, including BOFORS, SAAB, HÄGGLUNDS and ERICSSON, which 
have been, and still are, of great importance for the Swedish economy and employment.  
After 1989 and with the fall of the Berlin Wall, along with the dissipation of the 
Warsaw Pact, a big change took place in the Swedish defense and security policy. A 
direct threat to Sweden is no longer imminent, and the focus is now on participating in 
international peace support operations (PSOs). Since 1994, Sweden has become a 
participating member of the European Union (EU). Within the EU, there is a range of 
common defense and security policies that Sweden, among the other member nations, is 
highly involved in. In the framework of the EU, the membership nations contribute 
military resources in order to form tools of strength supporting the common defense and 
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security policy of all member nations. One step in this direction is to form independent 
Battle Groups that can be deployed rapidly in different conflicts. In this modern era and 
in the view of the described Battle Groups, it has become important for the Swedish 
Armed Forces to have interoperability with the armed forces of other nations. This is not 
a unique concern for Sweden; many other countries have also followed the same path and 
developed their military concepts to be used mainly for homeland defense. In fact, the fall 
of the Berlin Wall and the dissipation of the Warsaw Pact not only made significant and 
observable geographical and political changes, it also constituted paradigm shift for how 
to use military forces in many European countries in support of national objectives.   
B. MILITARY STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES 
According to national defense doctrines, the most important goal for the Swedish 
Armed Forces is to maintain the ability to conduct armed combat. The overall goal for the 
Swedish Armed Forces is to see that Sweden, alone or in cooperation with others, can 
protect its basic foundation and its national interests.  By preventing and managing 
conflicts and war, Sweden can ensure its sovereignty and protect its society and 
functionality.  
The primary tasks for the Swedish Armed Forces are:  
1. Protect Sweden and ensure our security, by conducting operations on 
Swedish territory and in the vicinity of Sweden, but also outside Sweden 
through Peace Support Operations.   
2. Detect and reject violations of the Swedish territory in accordance with  
International Law.  
3. Support the Swedish society with military resources, when needed.  
 
Even if the change in the Swedish defense and security policy has made the 
Swedish Armed Forces more involved in international operations, the ability for building 
and sustaining homeland defense will always be an essential objective. The decreased 
direct threat against Sweden—the outcome after 1989—could rapidly change. All 
sovereign countries need the ability to defend itself at all times. Certain areas around 
Sweden will always be of special interest. The Baltic Sea is surrounded by many 
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countries and Sweden is one of them. Resources for energy and transportation are some 
of the important social and economic activities that have to be coordinated between all 
involved countries. There is always a risk of tensions between countries in the Baltic Sea 
area, and Swedish Armed Forces may be involved [9].  
In order to defend Swedish territory, the Swedish Armed Forces needs to freely 
conduct land-based operations. On the tactical level for land-based operations, forces 
conduct all required operations within the framework of unit size—typically a brigade. 
The core units in this tactical land-based force will consist of high mobility armored 
units. Additional units for combat support and combat service support will migrate this 
brigade unit to a land-based tactical battle group. The tactical land-based force must be 
able to conduct operations in all parts of Sweden, which varies from flat agricultural 
terrain to hilly forests and urban terrain. In this diverse scenario, the tactical commander 
needs a reliable and sufficient communications system. The basic requirements for such 
tactical communications system are to provide transmission of voice, data and video.  
The third primary task for the Swedish Armed Forces is to support society when 
needed. Under normal circumstances, the Swedish society is self-sustainable. Authorities 
such as the police, customs and coast guard have responsibilities to ensure that people 
follow the law, and that the borders are secured under normal, everyday conditions. The 
fire department is responsible for helping people in case of fire, flooding, accidents or 
other emergencies. Several additional authorities cooperate in order to maintain the 
functionality of the society, ensuring health and protection for all.  
In some cases, the Swedish Armed Forces may be needed to support society. 
There can be particular accidents in which the regular authorities do not have the right 
assets to handle the situation. There can also be situations when the regular authorities 
simply do not have enough resources. In these cases, the Swedish Armed Forces can be 
called upon to support society. Also in these cases when supporting society, there are 
needs for tactical communications in order to command, control and coordinate the 
military units that participate. There is also a need for military units to communicate on 
the tactical level with units from the police, customs, coast guard and the fire department.  
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C. SWEDEN AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Sweden became a member of the European Union in 1994, after which the 
European Security and Defense Policy became an important part of Sweden’s own 
security policy and the development of the Swedish Armed Forces. In the European 
Security Strategy, the importance of cooperation is emphasized. A threat in the form of a 
large-scale aggression towards any of the members is not very likely, but there are other 
persuasive threats that the Union members are facing.  
The emerging terrorism, which utilizes the openness in Swedish society, has 
become a threat. States within the European Union have become terrorism targets as well 
as a base for conducting terrorist acts that may have consequence elsewhere. Organized 
crime is a problem that the states in Europe have to deal with on an everyday basis. 
Drugs, trafficking, weapons and illegal immigrants are examples of security problems 
that are of great concern within the EU.  Organized crime affects Europe internally 
because Europe has proven to be an easy target. Organized crime is also an external 
issue, and it is most often connected to states far from Europe. There could also be links 
between organized crime and terrorism. Another major threat is the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction. Biological science, together with the knowledge of how to 
use missiles, are potential tools against a perceived adversary in Europe. Regional 
conflicts and state failure are problems that can impact the European Union, directly or 
indirectly. State failure is often caused by internal problems such as bad governance and 
corruption. Problems described earlier as terrorism and organized crime can also be 
related to state failure, since these states can act as bases for organized crime as well as 
for terrorism. Countries such as Somalia, Liberia and Afghanistan are examples of states 
that have failed [9].  
The strategy that the European Union has chosen to deal with these new threats is 
to be able to act before a crisis has started. The key elements in this approach are:  
 More active 
 More capable 
 More coherent 
 Working with partners 
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In order to achieve these key element objectives, certain strategies were agreed 
upon.  The European Union should be active in working for peace and security globally, 
and should support the United Nations when it responds to threats to international peace. 
A joint effort to an upcoming crisis must be initiated before the problem becomes too 
severe. The military capabilities within the union have to be more flexible, mobile and 
able to be rapidly deployed. Efficiency can be accomplished if assets are pooled and 
shared, and the duplication of capabilities is avoided. A coherency in the response to a 
problem is best achieved by coordinating all the efforts, not only the military. In a 
comprehensive approach for building security, the European Union should coordinate 
diplomatic efforts, development, trade and environmental policies with military efforts. 
The last, but not least, key element is to work together with all other participating 
partners. A crisis or a problem can seldom be solved by one country alone. Cooperation 
with other states and organizations is essential. As previously mentioned, the connection 
between the European Union and the United Nations will most likely continue to be the 
baseline in future EU actions. Other relations, however, are also important. One 
relationship is emphasized and especially mentioned in the European Security Strategy. 
The transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together, the 
European Union and the United States can be formidable force for the 
good world. Our aim should be an effective and balanced partnership with 
the USA. [10] 
D. PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS 
In accordance with the primary tasks for the Swedish Armed Forces, one of the 
most important is to ensure Sweden’s security by conducting relevant military operations. 
The Swedish Armed Forces is required to have the ability to conduct operations not only 
on Swedish territory and in the vicinity of Sweden, but also internationally by Peace 
Support Operations.  
Sweden’s participation in international peace support operations (PSOs) increased 
during the 1990s. The major reason for this turn in Sweden’s defense and security policy 
was a combination of the changes in Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall and with 
Sweden’s membership in the European Union. During the conflict in Bosnia from 1993 
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to 1995, Sweden participated with one armored battalion in UNPROFOR, led by the 
United Nations. The operation in Bosnia was followed by another PSO action on the 
Balkans, the KFOR operation in Kosovo. Both of those operations required high 
standards of tactical communications support. UNPROFOR and KFOR operations 
needed to be conducted over extensive geographic areas. The hilly terrain on the Balkans 
decreases the coverage for radio communication.  
Since the beginning of 2001, Sweden has participated in the International Security 
and Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. In early 2001, ISAF was led by a coalition 
of a number of European countries, and the force was mandated to conduct operations 
only in and near Kabul. Today, ISAF is led by NATO and operates in all of Afghanistan. 
Since 2006, Sweden has been responsible for a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in 
Mazar-e-Sharif in the northern part of Afghanistan. The present Swedish force in 
Afghanistan is of battalion size, with three infantry companies together with combat 
support and units for logistics and communications. The tactical requirements in 
Afghanistan are similar to those experienced previously on the Balkans. The Swedish 
force has to cover large areas, and the ranges for radio communication decrease because 
of the hilly terrain.  
Sweden has also participated in peace support operations mandated and directed 
by the European Union. The operations on the Balkans, in Bosnia and in Kosovo, 
transformed from NATO-operations to EU-operations. The European Union has also 
conducted peace support operations in Africa. The most recent EU-operation Sweden 
participated in was EUFOR in Chad and in the Central African Republic.  
According to established planning directions for the Swedish Armed Forces, 
Sweden must have the ability to deploy 2,000 troops simultaneously, distributed over 
four operational areas. At least one of these four operations must be of battalion size [9]. 
In the Headline Goal 2010 for the European Union, the ability to react fast to dynamic 
security challenges is emphasized. Using troop contributions from all member states, the 
EU must be able to deploy up to 60,000 troops within 60 days for engagement in major 
operation. Two major, simultaneous peace-building operations should possible, supported 
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by 10,000 troops. An additional capability is required for use in evacuation operations 
and rapid response situations where a battle group of about 3,000 troops is required [11].   
Periodically, the Swedish Armed Forces is required to organize a Battle Group in 
the framework of the European Union. The first battle group that Sweden was responsible 
for was organized in 2008. It became a combined and joint force consisting of units from 
several neighboring countries and was named the Nordic Battle Group 2008 (NBG 08). 
In 2011, Sweden was once again responsible for organizing a similar battle group (NBG 
11).  
The tactical communication system used for forces deployed in international 
peace support operations must have high mobility and must be able to operate globally 
wherever needed. Communications are also required to operate in a wide range of 
climates. In some cases, when operating in Africa for example, the climate can be hot and 
with high humidity. When operating in the framework of NATO or EU, there is also a 
requirement for interoperability of communications among the many diverse players.   
E. COMMAND AND CONTROL 
1. General Principles for Command and Control 
The system for command and control within the Swedish Armed Forces is based 
on basic principles. One of the most vital principles is that the overall strategic goal shall 
influence all levels of operations. Operational art is defined as the link between the 
military strategic goals and the tactical actions taken on the battlefield [12]. This 
fundamental principle comes basically from the military theorist Carl von Clausewitz and 
from his well-known book, “On War.” Clausewitz emphasizes that the use of military 
force should not be an isolated action. Using military force should be considered an 
extension of a nation’s political will and should be related to political goals [13]. This 
important factor leads to transparency in the military system and between levels within 
the operational hierarchy.  
On the operational level, the dominant principle is maneuver warfare. In 
maneuver warfare, the goal is to affect your adversary’s mental desire to continue the 
fight. In other terms, the goal is to make your opponents surrender their will to fight. 
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When conducting this type of warfare, your own force tries to move so that it can get a 
favorable position towards your opponent [14]. Offensive actions against your opponent 
are aimed at his vulnerabilities. The term maneuver warfare should not be seen in only 
the direct operational context. It is more of a mindset that should influence all planning 
and actions taken within your tactical force. Key elements in maneuver warfare are:  
 Initiative 
 Tempo 
 Mission type tactics or directive control 
To take and maintain the initiative in operations, is important to be one step ahead 
of your adversary. Having the initiative, you can control what is going to happen on the 
battlefield. Your opponent will be forced to act defensively and follow your actions in 
order to protect himself.   
Operations tempo is another important factor in maneuver warfare. In order to be 
one step ahead of your opponent, you need to have a high operational tempo. Working 
together, both initiative and tempo are related to the OODA-loop, which was founded by 
the United States Air Force Colonel John Boyd [15]. The essence in the OODA-loop is to 
maintain initiative and tempo so that your decision cycle (Kill-Chain) is faster than that 
of your opponent.  
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Figure 4.   OODA-loop (From [16]) 
When acting against an adversary, the commander will try to disrupt and create 
confusion in the opponent’s decision cycle in order to make the adversary lose initiative 
and slow down his tempo. In other words, disrupt your adversary’s OODA-loop [17].  
The third key element for maneuver warfare is mission-type tactics or directive 
control. This element considers the technique of how to command the sub-units within 
the force. The bottom line in mission-type tactics or directive control is to give your 
subordinated commanders the ability to make decisions on their level. When the 
commander is tasking his units, he will present and distribute the overall goal and the 
purpose for the operation, the so-called Commanders Intent. The orders to his 
subordinated commanders will be expressed as of what should be achieved and not how it 
should be done. Ideally, these expectations are formulated as minimum objectives (i.e., 
threshold requirements), as opposed to ideal or optimal goals. The opposite of this 
“directed order” principle is command guidance. Using command guidance, the 







subordinated commanders will have very little room for creativity when conducting such 
an operation. There is a risk that command guidance in general will significantly slow the 
decision cycle. Giving your subordinated commanders too many restrictions and 
limitations will make them unable to take the initiative, and the whole operation will be 
slow and predictable. There are situations where command guidance is preferable, but the 
general principle used within the Swedish Armed Forces is still mission-type tactics or 
directive control.  
2. Command and Control Structures and Processes 
Since the 1990s, the Swedish Armed Forces has transformed, step by step, the 
structure for the operational command. Today’s structure for the Swedish Joint Forces 
Command follows the same principles as an operational command in NATO or in EU. It 
was a natural step after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and further on when Sweden 
became a member of the European Union. The operational command for the Swedish 
Armed Forces is organized in a regular NATO joint structure. The joint operational 
command consists of the various J’s, together with the component commands for the 
services, land, maritime and air (see Figure 5).   
 
 




The command structure on the tactical force level for land-based units is also 
organized in accordance to NATO. The functions are represented in an S-structure (see 
Figure 6).  
 
Figure 6.   Tactical Force Headquarters 
The term interoperability is not limited to the technical perspective. In order to 
cooperate with other nations, terminology and methods in planning are also important. 
For operational planning, the NATO Operational Planning Procedure (OPP) is used 
where the main joint publication is called Guidance for Operational Planning (GOP). The 
main idea of using the OPP and GOP is to have a comprehensive approach when 
planning the operation, which will ensure that the strategic goals are thoroughly 
considered throughout the plan. The actions on a tactical level are initiated from the 
strategic/operational level. When the operational plan is started, an ongoing process 
coordinates all tactical operations so that they meet the overall strategic goals. Typical 
planning methods used on the tactical level follow the principles for OPP/GOP, but are 
more simplified in order to satisfy the need for tempo in operations.   
F. REQUIREMENTS ON RADIO COMMUNICATION 
To identify the key factors for a tactical wireless communication system for the 
Swedish Armed Forces, it is essential to analyze relevant updated documents used for 
present radio communication systems. For this analysis, a study was made of the tactical 
and technical specifications documents for the Swedish software-defined radio system 
GTRS [18], [19]. These documents are relevant to identify generic key needs for an 
optimal, tactical communications system.  
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1.  Tactical Requirements 
In the GTRS specification document, the ability for the tactical force to maintain 
flexibility and mobility is emphasized. The tactical communication system must adapt to 
the speed and maneuverability in operations that any tactical force requires. Operations 
can be carried out on Swedish territory, in the vicinity of Sweden or through an 
International Peace Support Operation (PSO) outside of Sweden. In terms of international 
PSOs, the tactical communications system must support the doctrine for the European 
Union (EU) guidelines for crisis management. A tactical land-based force has to be able 
to conduct operations wherever needed, and the tactical communications system that 
supports the force is required to operate in all climate zones, from tropical to sub-arctic. 
A wireless tactical system also has to provide a near real-time communication capability.   
Sweden has a general Network Centric Warfare (NCW) approach when 
developing communication systems within the Swedish Armed Force. The GTRS-system 
will bring the NCW approach to the tactical level. The software defined radios within the 
GTRS project are evolutionary based and must be readily upgradable to new versions and 
technologies.   
The tactical communications system shall cover an area of 1,500 km2 with a range 
up to 10 km between the nodes. If needed, the tactical force shall be able to divide itself 
into sub-units; in this case, the entire tactical communications system must extend its 
coverage to an area of 3,000 km2 with a maximum range up to 100 km between the 
subunits. For a tactical force of battalion size, the area that is required to be covered will 
be up to 500 km2 [18], [19].   
2.  Communications Requirements 
The GTRS system has to provide communications for voice, data, text, pictures, 
video, and video conference. The hardware in the tactical communications system should 
be flexible to the authorized and allocated frequency spectrum used in order to adapt to 
the frequencies that will be allowed in the actual operation. When communications are 
designed for self-configured networking, the network should be able to contain up to 280 
nodes. For a battalion, the numbers of nodes required are 140.  
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The waveform development shall be based on the Software Communications 
Architecture (SCA). The data communications shall support TCP/IP/Ethernet standard 
and shall be able to use both IPv4 and IPv6 data formats. The data rate between nodes in 
a network shall be adaptable, but the minimum requirement for data rate between any two 
nodes is 1 Mbps.  
3.  Security 
The tactical communications system has to be able to operate in environments 
where the adversary uses electronic attack (EA). The communications system, therefore, 
needs to be resistant to hostile jamming. The system also needs to be resistant and endure 
through hostile environments due to high-power microwave weapons (HPM) and to 
electromagnetic pulse (EMP).  
In terms of information security, the tactical communications system shall allow 
secure communication up to the level of SECRET.  
4.  Interoperability 
The main purpose for GTRS interoperability is the ability to communicate with 
participating forces from other nations in international peace support operations. The 
tactical communications system has to be adapted to international standards and be 
interoperable to NATO and EU. For interoperability to NATO, the tactical 
communications system should be adapted to NATO STANAG.  
According to standards for data communication, the software development shall 
be based on Software Communications Architecture (SCA) and support the protocols 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and Internet Protocol (IP).  
For domestic interoperability, the tactical communications system shall be able to 
communicate with systems used by units from Swedish civilian authorities, police, 
customs, coast guard and the fire department.  
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G. PAST PROBLEM AREAS 
The predecessors of radio communications systems that have been used before 
our software-defined radios has served the Swedish Armed Forces well, but previous 
systems have operational, design, and interfacing limitations that must be overcome when 
the Swedish Armed Forces face future operations.  
The limited bandwidth that older systems have offered is one factor of concern for 
the commander’s need in a modern operational environment. Both the tactical 
commander and his subordinated commanders need a great deal of information, which 
requires a high throughput in the communication systems. The lack of ability to upgrade 
and improve the system performance is another problem area connected with older 
systems. In older hardware intensive radios, the performance of the radio was hard-coded 
in the equipment. Older radios gave little room to modify modulation, spread spectrum 
techniques, encryption or other elements associated with the waveform. Another problem 
area associated with older radio systems is the lack of compatibility and interoperability. 
When developing the core radio system that we use today, there was little concern over 
the ability to communicate with others units outside the force. The radio system was 
specified to be used for the Swedish Armed Forces, applied mainly for homeland 
defense. The interoperability track record with other nations’ systems has proven to be 
limited when Sweden has participated in international peace support operations. This has 
to change in future designs.  
H. CONCLUSIONS 
After the analysis of the military context for future tactical wireless 
communications, the following key needs are recognized:  
A future tactical wireless communications system must support the commander’s 
needs for commanding and controlling his/her force. According to the principles that 
Sweden applies for command and control requirements, a tactical communications 
system with sufficient capacity for voice, text, data, pictures and video is needed. This 
need of information is not only for the commander’s concern, it is also a concern for the 
subordinated commanders when they all need to share the same information base in a 
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joint common operational picture. A future tactical communications system must also 
satisfy the need for flexibility. The operations tempo is essential in maneuver warfare, 
and tactical communications systems have to be adaptable enough to the required force 
movements expected in the battlefield. A key word for today’s operations is cooperation. 
In order to cooperate with other services, or other nations, Sweden needs to have 
interoperability with working partners  
The following statements summarize the basis for technical requirements for a 
Swedish Armed Forces tactical communication system: 
 Sustained operational capability (even during jamming, HPM and EMP) 
 Ability to connect up to 280 nodes (for a battalion 140 nodes) 
 Provide a minimum data rate at 1 Mbps 




– Existing/available resources 
When analyzing the Swedish defense and security policy and the military context 
concerning when and how to use the Swedish Armed Forces, the conclusion is that the 
most likely operational scenario is for international peace support operations. Sweden’s 
membership within the European Union, together with the low probability of direct 
threats against Sweden, makes the focus for the Swedish Armed Forces requirement to be 
at international peace support operations (PSO). The modeling further on in this thesis 
will therefore be based on a PSO operational scenario.  
 26
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 27
III. TECHNOLOGIES FOR WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS 
SYSTEMS 
A. WAVEFORMS FOR SOFTWARE DEFINED RADIOS 
This chapter presents more detail into various technologies available for wireless 
communications. In a software-defined radio, it is the waveform design that ultimately 
controls the performance of the communication system. The following analysis will 
therefore focus on the waveforms developed within the JTRS and GTRS projects 
previously mentioned.  
1. JTRS Waveforms  
JTRS SINCGARS 
JTRS SINCGARS is one of the first waveforms developed especially for JTRS. 
SINCGARS stands for Single Radio Channel Ground-Air System and this waveform is 
similar to the Wideband Networking Waveform based on the Software Communications 
Architecture (SCA) 2.2. The JTRS SINCGARS is a high-profile waveform that serves as 
the baseline in JTRS Ground Mobile Radio (GMR). The waveform is modular, where 
most of the processing is performed in general processors, and it provides a variety of 
modes of operation. JTRS SINCGARS is based on Internet Protocol (IP) technology 
communication infrastructure, which means that it uses common protocols for routing 
and interoperable to other IP networks using commercial routers. The JTRS SINCGARS 
waveform uses both frequency modulation (FM) and continuous phase frequency shift 
keying (CPFSK), whereas the operating mode Single Channel Plain Text (SCPT) uses 
FM and all the other modes uses CPFSK. The minimum data rate in JTRS SINCGARS is 
16kbps. The spread spectrum technique used in the waveform is Frequency Hopping 
Spread Spectrum (FHSS), but it can also operate in fixed frequency mode. The 
frequency-hopping mode operates in the frequency range of 30–88MHz and uses 2,320 
possible frequencies [20]. The predecessor to JTRS SINCGARS is the regular 
SINCGARS waveform, which has been widely used since the 1980s in the U.S. Armed 
Forces.  
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Wideband Networking Waveform (WNW) 
One of the first and primary waveforms developed for the JTRS GMR sub-
program is called Wideband Networking Waveform (WNW). This waveform is based on 
IP-technology and designed to be used in tactical ad hoc networking systems [21]. WNW 
is a digital waveform that uses high data rate Coded Orthogonal Frequency Division 
Multiplexing (COFDM). The range for the WNW data transmission rate is from 47 kbps 
to 12.1 Mbps. WNW is based on the Software Communications Architecture and a state-
of the art digital communication technique. WNW uses Differential Phase Shift Keying 
(DPSK) and Quadrature Phase Shift Keying (QPSK) modulation and encoding designs. 
As forward error correction, WNW employs Reed-Solomon and Turbo-code. COFDM 
provides a waveform that is bandwidth efficient and helps to suppress distortion caused 
by multipath, and also provides resistance against narrowband interference and impulsive 
noise [20]. Initially in the development of WNW, the standard data format IPv4 was 
used. For adaptation to future standards and increased demands on IP addressing, WNW 
will also be capable for IPv6 data format. In order to ensure secure networking, WNW 
uses High Assurance Internet Protocol Encryption (HAIPE). In JTRS networking 
architecture, packets will be transmitted in encrypted format between different radio 
frequency subnets. HAIPE will provide the required routing to reliably and efficiently 
manage different levels of security when nodes communicate in the network [22].    
 
Soldier Radio Waveform 
JTRS Handheld, Manpack, Small Form Fit (HMS) uses a waveform called 
Soldier Radio Waveform (SRW), which will operate in the frequency bands from 
450MHz to 1,000MHz or 350MHz to 2,700MHz. The objective for the Soldier Radio 
Waveform is to provide network communication between a large numbers of distributed 
nodes. The typical situation is communication between soldiers in a platoon. Recent tests 
have shown very promising results, where up to 36 radios have been able to communicate 
with each other during field conditions. The testing was in a mixed type of terrain with 
both forests and mountains in the communications environment, but some tests were also 
done in terrain with small city structures [23]. The Soldier Radio Waveform is described 
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as a self-healing network because, when nodes lose communication with each other 
caused by the terrain, they try to re-establish connectivity by leveraging all other 
available nodes. The SRW, similar to many cellular mobile phone systems, uses code 
division multiple access (CDMA) as the modulation scheme in order to get efficient 
communication between nodes. CDMA allows many soldiers to use the radios 
simultaneously, because each soldier is identified with a unique IP address. The data rate 
for the SRW is designed to be in the range between 450 kbps and 1.2 Mbps. There is also 
a “stealth” mode with a data rate between 2 kbps and 23.4 kbps, which is being 
developed to be difficult to reliably intercept.  
A radio system with SRW can be used to establish small ad hoc mobile wireless 
networks. Using separate frequencies allows a tactical communications subscriber to use 
one frequency for communications within the network and another frequency for the 
command and control of the unit. Other applications for this small version of JTRS are 
for Blue Force Tracking and Combat ID [24].  
2. GTRS Waveforms  
TETRA 
Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA) is the first waveform developed for GTRS. 
The technology in TETRA was used for several years as the basic communication 
standard within civilian emergency units, fire department and the police. In the early start 
for waveform development in GTRS, a software version of TETRA was chosen as the 
initial demonstrator. The initial design scope was to develop and implement a TETRA 
Mobile Station Waveform that will comply with Software Communications Architecture 
(SCA). TETRA is a digital mobile radio standard developed by the European 
Telecommunications Standard Institute (ETSI) that uses Time Division Multiple Access 
(TDMA). In early versions of TETRA, the data rate followed the NATO STANAG and 
was fairly low at 2,400 bits-per-second (bps). TETRA has developed an adaptive function 




Figure 7.   Packet data throughput in TETRA (From [25]) 
TDRS 
A waveform called Tactical Data Radio System (TDRS) was developed as a key 
wideband networking waveform for the GTRS project. TDRS is specified to satisfy the 
requirements for battalion-sized tactical force. The waveform is based on SCA and will 
have ad hoc networking capabilities [19]. TDRS waveform is similar to another 
waveform called FlexNet developed by Rockwell Collins. FlexNet is an IP/Ethernet 
based waveform and has a standard OSI layered protocol architecture [26]. The 
frequency range is 2 to 2,000 MHz, and the possible throughput according to the 
manufacturer is up to 5 Mbps. During field conditions and when several nodes have to 
share bandwidth, a more realistic level for the throughput will decrease to approximately 
1 Mbps. The FlexNet waveform will be flexible and highly configurable, and specified to 





B. MOBILE AD HOC NETWORKS 
1. MANET and CBMANET 
The main idea in a Mobile Ad hoc Network (MANET) is that all subscribers act 
as equal nodes within the system and are able to move freely and independently from 
each other.  The nodes should be able to connect and disconnect with each other while 
the network adapts to the nodes’ need for mobility. The origin for Mobile Ad hoc 
Networks was a DARPA project called Packet Radio Network (PRNet), which started in 
the beginning of the 1970s. PRNet was driven by what was, at that time, the newly 
invented packet switching technology. Since the start of PRNet, considerable 
development in technologies for coding, modulation and routing have been accomplished 
for wireless ad hoc networking. In 1997, a collaborative and coordinating group called 
MANET was formed within IETF to develop specifications and standards for ad hoc 
wireless networking [27].   
Management in an ad hoc wireless network is decentralized, and the 
communication between nodes is peer-to-peer. The nodes have to autonomously 
configure and reconfigure the network topology by communicating with each other. 
Since the nodes will change in numbers, locations and capability, the network topology, 
which is continuously routing packets, will become complex. In a pure MANET there is 
not any exterior infrastructure in the form of base stations and towers with antennas. 
Instead of fixed infrastructure, a MANET relies on sophisticated hardware and software 




Figure 8.   Mobile ad hoc network (From [29]) 
The basic idea that ad hoc networking provides adaptability and flexibility seems 
to be a perfect fit for a tactical communications solution, although some issues are 
inherent to this type of networking. Some of the problem areas addressed for MANETs 
are connectivity, bandwidth, resources, scalability and security [28]. The connectivity 
using wireless communication will always be affected by noise and the environment 
through which the signal has to propagate. In the case for MANETs in a land-based 
scenario, the links between nodes will be even more vulnerable because of limited 
antenna heights. Limitations in bandwidth will always be a reality for any wireless 
system in comparison to wired systems. For MANETs in general, factors such as 
multipath and fading decrease the available bandwidth. An increased need of an 
information flow in forms of routing between all nodes will also affect the available 
bandwidth. Limitations in resources are another problem area in a MANET. All nodes in 
a MANET require high storage capacity because there is no base station in the system to 
act as a centralized server and backup. In order to cover a large area in a battlefield, a 
MANET is also required to be highly scalable with the potential to respond to increased 
demand. When connecting the large amount of nodes required, it will again cause an 
additional need for routing information. The last problem area that should be emphasized 
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for MANETs is security. In general, there is an increased security concern for MANETs. 
Since nodes are continuously going in and out in the system, there is a risk for 
unauthorized access into the network. In a MANET where the networking is 
decentralized, this problem is even larger compared to a common wireless system where 
access control is centralized.  
As addressed earlier, many variables in ad hoc networking have to be 
communicated between the nodes in order to control and manage a MANET. This need 
of information flow will require, at a minimum, some bandwidth that will interfere with 
useful tactical information. In a more severe sense, there is a risk that nodes cannot be 
reached because important routing information has not been established. In order to make 
improvements in MANETs, a new DARPA project was formed, called Control Based 
Mobile Ad hoc Network (CBMANET).  Research in the CBMANET project aims to 
develop a new protocol stack that will be more efficient in ad hoc networking. A more 
sufficient protocol stack will make MANET more reliable and bandwidth efficient [30].  
Various transmission technologies with different coding, modulation and spread 
spectrum techniques can and have been used for ad hoc networking. The well-known 
IEEE-standard 802.11 in different forms can be used, as well as WiMAX (802.16). For 
military use within the JTRS project, the Wideband Networking Waveform (WNW) is 
developed to be used for ad hoc networking [22]. OFDM modulation was chosen for 
WNW in order to satisfy the requirement for large throughput in a tactical 
communication system. The Soldier Radio Waveform (SRW) is also developed to be 
used for ad hoc networking. WNW is adapted to be used for larger Software Defined 
Radio (SDR) applications in vehicles, compared to the SRW that is adapted for use in 
smaller SDR applications on a lower tactical level—for example, within a platoon or as 
communications between networking sensors.  
C. INFRASTRUCTURE-BASED SYSTEMS 
1. 3G 
The technology for digital cellular mobile phone systems used in Sweden started 
with Global System for Global Communications (GSM) in 1990s, and was defined as the 
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second generation (2G) of mobile phone systems. During this initial phase for digital 
mobile communication, the major focus was on voice communication. The GSM-
technology was based on time division multiple access (TDMA) where the subscribers, 
when communicating in the system, had access to a dedicated timeslot in the TDMA 
frame. The data rate that could be provided for each channel with TDMA was between 
9.6 kb/s to 14.4 kb/s [1]. The highly increasing need of dataflow for users demanding 
data and video capabilities made the GSM technology insufficient. Improvements to 
more efficiently manage the bandwidth between channels were accomplished through 
Enhanced Data Rates for GSM Evolution (EDGE). In some literature and articles, these 
improvements were called the “2.5G” of cellular mobile communications systems [31]. 
Still, the GSM-technology approach has its limitations when it comes to data 
communication.  
For the third generation (3G) of mobile communications systems, Sweden chose 
the technology called Universal Mobile Telecommunications Systems (UMTS), 
beginning in 2003. Instead of the modulation technique TDMA used in GSM, the 
modulation technology in UMTS is based on Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA). 
An overall benefit with CDMA is that you can have several subscribers using the same 
channel; in a bandwidth perspective, this will be more efficient. In CDMA, the data input 
signal is modulated with a coded signal called a Pseudo Noise (PN) sequence that has a 




Figure 9.   CDMA/PN-sequence (From [32]) 
The result will be an output signal with a unique code that is spread over a certain 
bandwidth. This spreading technique, combined with CDMA, is called Direct Sequence 
Spread Spectrum (DSSS) and offers some distinct advantages. The unique PN sequence 
provides privacy and prevents unauthorized actors from intercepting the information 
because only the authorized users who know the correct code will have access. Another 
advantage is frequency diversity. When the signal is spread over a larger bandwidth, it 
becomes less affected by noise and selective fading, which is typically narrowband. This 
characteristic also makes CDMA/DSSS more resistant against multipath, which is ever 
increasing in modern cell-phone environments. A CDMA/DSSS system is more adaptive 
in the relationship between the number of subscribers and the quality of service in the 
transmission. When the number of subscribers increases in a CDMA/DSSS system, the 
errors and the level of noise in the transmission will gradually increase. In a FDMA or a 
TDMA system, this relationship is fixed to the number of subscribers [1], [33].  
There are also some disadvantages using CDMA/DSSS. If the subscribers are not 
synchronized precisely, the spreading sequence will not be perfectly orthogonal, which 
can create self-jamming in the system. The lack of orthogonality in the received 
spreading sequence can also create problems when receiving both weak signals from far 
away and, at the same time, strong signals from nearby [1], [33]. To overcome this  
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problem, it is important to use techniques to control the power in CDMA/DSSS systems. 
The base station continuously measures the signal strength of each subscriber and sends 
power change commands [33].   
3G using UMTS has taken a big step to provide mobile use of IP. The previous 
2G technology used circuit switching; however, when going into 3G-technology, this has 
transformed to packet switching, which is common standard on the Internet. A mobile 
UMTS subscriber can, with a modern Smartphone, have access to the same features, such 
as e-mail and Internet surfing, which are used when connected to a Local Area Network 
(LAN) with Internet access. UMTS can provide a data rate from 128 kb/s up to 2 Mb/s. 
The available data rate will be highly dependent on the quality of the connection. When 
users are moving, the quality of the connection will vary. Even if the 3G has provided a 
much higher data rate compared to 2G, there is still a big difference when comparing to 
the data rates that can be achieved in wired and wireless LANs [31].  
A 3G cellular network will be based on an infrastructure where base stations will 
be deployed to cover a certain area. The structure of this network will be in the form of 
hexagons that can be clustered together to make it scalable and modular. The number of 
base stations that will be required for an area depends on environmental conditions and 
the number of subscribers to be served. Figure 10 shows the principles for how a cellular 
network can be built up.  
 
Figure 10.   Structures for cellular networks (From [32]) 
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The Ericsson telecommunications company has manufactured a 3G system named 
QuicLINK. This system is highly mobile and has been developed to be used in areas with 
limited infrastructure. QuicLINK is based on regular 3G technology and uses WCDMA 
modulation. The base stations in QuicLINK are small and modular in order to fit in 
various types of platforms.  
 
 
Figure 11.   Ericsson QuicLINK (From [34]) 
In order to build networks, the base stations are connected to radio relay 
equipment [34]. The Ericsson QuicLINK should be seen as one example of how civilian 
infrastructure-based technology can be used as tactical communication in a military 
context.  
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D. EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 
1. LTE and 4G 
The expression Long Term Evolution (LTE) is often associated with what will 
become the fourth generation of mobile communication, 4G. Originally, LTE was used 
since the development of 2G. A collaboration of groups within telecommunications 
formed a project called the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), which has been 
involved in the development of the improving technologies after 2G, such as 
GSM/EDGE and UMTS.  
The implementation of 4G cellular networks started in Sweden in 2010. During 
the first year, 4G networks were built in most of the major cities in Sweden. 4G will 
provide an IP-based mobile communication with a much higher data rate compared to 
3G. The carrier frequency for 4G will be at 5GHz and the targeted data rate will be from 
100 Mb/s up to 1,000 Mb/s [35]. To enhance the data rate from the previous system 
UMTS, 4G will use Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM). Digital video 
broadcasting and ADSL-modems for Internet-providers are examples of where OFDM 
already is used. The general idea in OFDM is to use a subset of sub-carriers that will be 
assigned to the different users. The frequencies for the sub-carriers are all multiples of the 




Figure 12.   Comparison FDM and OFDM (From [36]) 
Through advanced signal processing in the receiver using an Inverse Fast Fourier 
Transform algorithm, it is possible to detect the OFDM subscriber signals [36]. In order 
to prevent intersymbol inference, a guard band or time is built into the OFDM symbols 
carried by each sub-carrier. This guard time is created by a process called cyclic-prefix 
that ensures that the symbols in the bit stream will not interfere with each another [1]. To 
achieve a high data rate, the OFDM is combined with modulation-techniques like 
quadrature phase shift keying (QPSK) or quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM). An 
advantage with OFDM is that it can manage transmission in spite of bad conditions for 
propagation, and it is resistant to fading and multipath. Additional OFDM capabilities 
include the capability to use some of the available sub-carrier channels to sample the 
condition of the wireless channel and the ability (although not often used) to adjust the 
modulation techniques of the sub-carriers to improve their performance.  
E. CAPABILITIES AND SHORTFALLS 
After the initial analysis of different technologies, the following conclusion can be 
made:  
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The technology for ad hoc networking by using a MANET can provide a flexible 
communications solution. MANETs do not require any infrastructure, which makes this 
particular system extremely mobile. The development within JTRS shows that it is 
possible to produce waveforms such as the Wideband Networking Waveform (WNW) 
with sufficient capacity providing a bandwidth up to 12.1 Mbps. There are some issues 
with ad hoc networking though; for example, the management process for ad hoc 
networking is complex. Today’s technology requires a large flow of information 
overhead to keep track of all nodes for routing and other parameters needed for 
controlling the network. Another issue with ad hoc networking is area coverage. If the 
tactical force needs to cover a large operational area, the units need to spread out, which 
will probably have effects on connectivity and capacity in the network. There is also a 
risk that some nodes will have increased mobility because they need to act as relays 
between other nodes.  
Infrastructure-based technologies such as 3G and 4G can also provide an 
interesting communication solution. The most common system used today, 3G will 
provide a bandwidth that is in the lower level of what is required. The upcoming 
technology of 4G will more than satisfy today’s required bandwidth for a tactical force. 
The idea of a centralized infrastructure-based communications, such as 3G and 4G, will 
have both advantages and disadvantages. One advantage is that a centralized system will 
be easy to manage. In a centralized system, there will be a more straight-forward 
approach for routing and other flows of information needed to control the network. A 
disadvantage with an infrastructure-based system will be vulnerability. The whole 
communications solution will depend on the base stations that form the backbone. The 
base stations have to be protected in order to ensure functionality in a military tactical 
scenario. Both 3G and 4G require a number of base stations for building the network. In 
comparison between these two technologies, 4G will need more base stations to cover the 
same area as a 3G system.  
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IV. ANALYSIS THROUGH MODELING AND SIMULATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the possible technologies for tactical 
communication solutions. The different communication technologies are analyzed 
through modeling against an operational/tactical scenario. Initially, the modeling was 
made for tactical solutions based on the radio transmission that is commonly used in 
today’s tactical systems. This network served as a reference or baseline for performance. 
Thereafter, tactical solutions were based on ad hoc networking and 3G/UMTS-
technology. The solutions are the performance compared to the reference system. The 
results of the analysis are used for evaluation in the next chapter.  
B. JOINT COMMUNICATION SIMULATION SYSTEM 
In this thesis project, Joint Communication Simulation System (JCSS) was chosen 
as the software to model and simulate the different technologies for wireless 
communications. The JCSS software is based on the well-known OPNET software that is 
commonly used for developing and validating networks in commercial applications. 
JCSS provides features that are easily tailored and adapted for military use. When 
developing the networks for this thesis project the Department for Information Systems 
Agency (DISA) in Arlington, Virginia together with the OPNET’s headquarters in 
Bethesda, Maryland provided a significant level of support. DISA provided JCSS training 
to the author and simulated network developments. OPNET provided exceptional support 
in debugging these networks models, and they also provided subject matter expertise 
while the UMTS network was under development. In cooperation with both DISA and 
OPNET the following models were created as a part of this thesis project.  
 SINCGARS Network 
 Mobile Ad hoc Network (MANET) 
 3G/UMTS Network 
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These three models were developed specifically for this thesis project and were 
adapted in architecture to be used for a land force of battalion size.  
The experience gained from using JCSS/OPNET is that the software worked well 
for measuring the networks according to the stated goals and objectives of this research. 
When properly used, these software tools can provide a sufficient simulation for military 
networks operating in a field environment.  
C. TACTICAL FORCE AND SCENARIO SETUP 
The operational/tactical scenario chosen for the analysis is a generic Peace 
Support Operation (PSO). The terrain for the scenario is fictitious and was chosen to 
provide the most realistic input possible for wave propagation calculations within the 
simulation software. The tactical force will be configured to simulate the Maneuver 
Battalion within the Nordic Battle Group 2011 (NBG11) and the Maneuver Battalion will 
conduct operations within an Area of Responsibility (AOR) that correlates to cover a 
500-km2 requirement [19].  
The Maneuver Battalion within NBG11 consists of the following sub-units [37]: 
– 1 Battalion Headquarters 
– 2 Mechanized Companies 
– 1 Air Assault Squadron 
– 1 Combat Support Company 
– 1 Logistics Company 
As applied to these simulations, NBG11 will be deployed to support an ongoing 
UN-operation. Since there has been tension between the two warring factions, NBG11 in 
their peacekeeping mission will separate the two principal opponents in order to ensure 
security for the civilians who live and work in the area. The Maneuver battalion within 
NBG11 and all of its resources will be responsible for the main part of the AOR. Each 
subordinated company will be responsible for their individual positions of the AOR, 
ensuring security for civilians by conducting mobile surveillance operations and 
 43
patrolling. The subordinated companies will be prepared to quickly mobilize support for 
other units within the whole AOR when needed.  
 
 
Figure 13.   Maneuver battalion within NBG11 
D. SCENARIOS 
In order to realistically evaluate different wireless technologies, the networks will 
be analyzed through three individual scenarios. When building the tactical 
communication solutions for the three scenarios, the hierarchy for each network has been 
intentionally made flat. A flat hierarchy will enhance full transparency between the 
highest and the lowest level in the tactical force. The MANET solution was not divided in 
different subnets for different companies. If the MANET were divided in subnets, the 
comparison between a MANET and an infrastructure-based system would not be 
balanced and the subnet dividing will also decrease the ability for end-to-end 
communication between the highest and the lowest level in the tactical force.  
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1. Scenario 1: Surveillance  
In the first scenario, the battalion will conduct surveillance in the given AOR. The 
battalion consists of one Battalion Commander, three Company Commanders and nine 
patrols. All units will be spread out in the entire battalion area and conduct surveillance 
from fixed positions. Communications that have the highest priority are the links between 
the Battalion Commander and the three Company Commanders.  
2. Scenario 2: Movement within AOR 
In the second scenario, an incident happens within the AOR, which requires units 
to move to this location in order to secure the incident area. The place for the incident is 
arbitrarily located in the southwest corner of the AOR.  Three patrols, together with a 
Company Commander, will move to the incident location. Communications that have the 
highest priority are the link to the patrol that is closest to the incident and the link to the 
Company Commander that is assigned command and control responsibility for the 
operation.   
3. Scenario 3: Extended AOR 
In the third scenario, there is a risk that hostile actions can occur in the area south 
of the deployed battalion. In order to act against this potential threat, the AOR will be 
extended, and three patrols and one Company Commander will move south in order to 
secure and cover this area. Communications that have the highest priority are the links to 
the two patrols that first enter the extended AOR and the link to the Company 
Commander that is assigned to monitor the extension of the AOR.   
E. MODELING OVERVIEW 
1.1 SINCGARS Network, Scenario 1, surveillance 
1.2 SINCGARS Network, Scenario 2, movement within AOR 
1.3 SINCGARS Network, Scenario 3, extended AOR 
2.1 MANET, Scenario 1, surveillance 
2.2 MANET, Scenario 2, movement within AOR 
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2.3 MANET, Scenario 3, extended AOR 
3.1 Infrastructure Based UMTS Network, Scenario 1, surveillance 
3.2 Infrastructure Based UMTS Network, Scenario 2, movement within AOR 
3.3 Infrastructure Based UMTS Network, Scenario 3, extended AOR  
F. SINCGARS NETWORK MODELING 
Model Network 1 is a SINCGARS broadcasting network based on the AN-PSC 
5A radio. The SINCGARS network communications are based on the following 
parameters. See Table 1.  
 
SINCGARS Network 
Frequency range 30-89 MHz 
Output power 20 W 
Modulation/Spread Spectrum FM/FHSS 
Simulated traffic in the network IER:s (Information Exchange Requirements) of 
64 kbps sent every 100 s. Protocol UDP 
Table 1.   Data for SINCGARS Network model 
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1. SINCGARS Network, Scenario 1: Surveillance  
Network overview 
 
Figure 14.   1.1 SINCGARS Network, Scenario 1: Surveillance 
Simulation parameters 
The simulation time for 1.1 SINCGARS Network, Scenario 1, surveillance was 
set to 60 minutes. Traffic was simulated by sending IERs between the 13 nodes during 
the simulation time. The tactical force covers an area of 24 km * 21 km, which is equal to 
approximately 500 km2. The 13 nodes are stationary and do not move in this scenario. 
Communications with the highest priority in this scenario are the links between the 
Battalion Commander and the three Company Commanders.  
Results 
Overall IER average completion rate: 96% 
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Statistic  Average  Maximum  Minimum  
Total Data IERs Completion Rate  0.96034  0.97152  0.00694  
Table 2.   Overall throughput for the 1.1 SINCGARS Network, Scenario 1, 
surveillance 
 
Performance for communications with the highest priority: 
Battalion Commander to Commanders Company 1, Company 2 and Company 3 
 
Figure 15.   Throughput between nodes with high priority in 1.1 SINCGARS Network, 
Scenario 1, surveillance  
Comments 
The simulation result for the 1.1 SINCGARS Network, Scenario 1, surveillance, 
shows that there is a high throughput of IERs in the network. The result correlates with 
what should be expected for a frequency-hopping network with regular combat net 
broadcast technology. A SINCGARS network should be able to connect all nodes in an 
Battalion Commander – Commander Company 1 
Battalion Commander – Commander Company 2 
Battalion Commander – Commander Company 3 
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area of 500 km2 but the data rate is assumed to be lower compared to what should be 
expected for more modern modulation technologies.  
2. SINCGARS Network, Scenario 2, Movement within AOR 
Network overview 
 
Figure 16.   1.2 SINCGARS Network, scenario 2, movement within AOR 
Simulation parameters 
The simulation time for 1.2 SINCGARS Network, Scenario 2, movement within 
AOR, was set to 60 minutes. Traffic was simulated by sending IERs between the 13 
nodes during the simulation time. The tactical force covers an area of 24 km * 21 km, 
which is equal to approximately 500 km2. Four of the units within the tactical force will 
move towards a location in the southwest part of the AOR where an incident has 
occurred. The other nine units within the tactical force will be stationary. 
Communications with the highest priority in this scenario are the links between the 
Battalion Commander and the moving units, which corresponds to the following nodes: 
Commander Company 2, Patrol 2.3, and Patrol 3.3.  
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Result 
Overall IER average completion rate: 91% 
Statistic  Average  Maximum  Minimum  
Total Data IERs Completion Rate  0.90992  0.92222  0.00641  
Table 3.   Overall throughput for the 1.2 SINCGARS Network, Scenario 2,  
movement within AOR 
Performance for communications with the highest priority:  
Battalion Commander to Commander Company 2, Patrol 2-3, and Patrol 3-3 
 
Figure 17.   Throughput between nodes with high priority in 1.2 SINCGARS Network, 
Scenario 2, movement within AOR 
Comments 
The throughput of IERs decreased slightly in 1.2 SINCGARS Network, Scenario 
2, movement within AOR, compared to scenario 1, from 96% to 91%. The overall 
 
Battalion Commander – Commander Company 2
Battalion Commander – Patrol 2-3
Battalion Commander – Patrol 3-3
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throughput should still be considered as delivering an acceptable level. Since the 
movement of nodes will create interference in some of the transmissions of IERs, the 
result is expected.   
3. SINCGARS Network, Scenario 3, Extended AOR 
Network overview 
 
Figure 18.   1.3 SINCGARS Network, Scenario 3, extended AOR 
Simulation parameters 
The simulation time for 1.3 SINCGARS Network, Scenario 3, extended AOR, 
was set to 60 minutes. Traffic was simulated by sending IERs between the 13 nodes 
during the simulation time. The tactical force covers initially an area of 24 km * 21 km, 
which is equal to approximately 500 km2. Due to hostile actions outside the initial AOR, 
four of the units within the tactical force have to move south. The tactical force will, after 
this movement, cover an area of 24 km * 27 km, which is equal to approximately 650 
km2. The other nine units within the tactical force will be stationary. Communications 
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with the highest priority in this scenario are the links between the Battalion Commander 
and the moving units, which corresponds to the following nodes: Commander Company 
3, Patrol 2.3, and Patrol 3.2.  
Result 
Overall IER average completion rate: 79% 
Statistic  Average  Maximum  Minimum  
Total Data IERs Completion Rate  0.79098  0.80208  0.00694  
Table 4.   Overall throughput for the 1.3 SINCGARS Network, Scenario 3,  
extended AOR 
Performance for communications with the highest priority:  
Battalion Commander to Commander Company 3, Patrol 2-3, and Patrol 3-2 
 
Figure 19.   Throughput between nodes with high priority in 1.3 SINCGARS Network, 
Scenario 3, extended AOR 
 
Battalion Commander – Commander Company 3
Battalion Commander – Patrol 2-3
Battalion Commander – Patrol 3-2
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Comments 
The throughput of IERs significantly decreased in 1.3 SINCGARS Network, 
Scenario 3, extended AOR, from 96% in scenario 1 to 79% in this scenario. The 
throughput of IERs to the nodes that move south has greatly decreased. The decreased 
throughput in extended coverage area of scenario 3 shows that the links between nodes in 
a regular broadcasting network will be greatly degraded when the ranges approach the 
limit for connectivity.  
G. MANET NETWORK MODELING 
Model Network 2 will be based on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking (MANET) 
technology.   
 
MANET Network 
Frequency range 2.4 GHz 
Output power 20 W 
Modulation/Spread Spectrum/Routing OFDM/OLSR Ad-Hoc routing protocol 
Simulated traffic in the network IER:s (Information Exchange Requirements) of 
64 kbps sent every 100 s. Protocol UDP 













1. MANET, Scenario 1, Surveillance  
Network overview 
 
Figure 20.   2.1 MANET, Scenario 1, surveillance  
Simulation parameters 
The simulation time for 2.1 MANET, Scenario 1, surveillance, was set to 60 
minutes. Traffic was simulated by sending IERs between the 13 nodes during the 
simulation time. The tactical force covers an area of 24 km * 21 km, which is equal to 
approximately 500 km2. The 13 nodes are stationary and do not move in this scenario. 
Communications with the highest priority in this scenario are the links between the 







Overall IER average completion rate: 99% 
Statistic  Average  Maximum  Minimum  
Total Data IERs Completion Rate  0.98646  0.99359  0.00641  
Table 6.   Overall throughput for the 2.1 MANET, Scenario 1, surveillance 
 
Performance for communications with the highest priority: 
Battalion Commander to Commanders Company 1, Company 2 and Company 3 
 





Battalion Commander – Commander Company 1 
Battalion Commander – Commander Company 2 
Battalion Commander – Commander Company 3 
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Comments 
The overall throughput for IERs for 2.1 MANET, Scenario 1, surveillance, is very 
high with an average completion rate of 99%. According to the high throughput, it seems 
that there is a high connectivity between the nodes in the network. In comparison with the 
SINCGARS network for the same scenario, the throughput is even higher.  
2. MANET, Scenario 2, Movement within AOR 
Network overview 
 
Figure 22.   2.2 MANET, Scenario 2, movement within AOR 
Simulation parameters 
The simulation time for 2.2 MANET, Scenario 2, movement within AOR, was set 
to 60 minutes. Traffic was simulated by sending IERs between the 13 nodes during the 
simulation time. The tactical force covers an area of 24 km * 21 km, which is equal to 
approximately 500 km2. Four of the units within the tactical force will move towards a 
location in the southwest part of the AOR where an incident has occurred. The other nine 
units within the tactical force will be stationary. Communications with the highest  
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priority in this scenario are the links between the Battalion Commander and the moving 
units, which corresponds to the following nodes: Commander Company 2, Patrol 2.3, and 
Patrol 3.3.  
Results 
Overall IER average completion rate: 99% 
Statistic  Average  Maximum  Minimum  
Total Data IERs Completion Rate  0.98731  0.98893  0.00641  
Table 7.   Overall throughput for the 2.2 MANET, Scenario 2, movement within AOR 
Performance for communications with the highest priority:  
Battalion Commander to Commander Company 2, Patrol 2-3, and Patrol 3-3 
 
Figure 23.   Throughput between nodes with high priority in 2.2 MANET, Scenario 2, 
movement within AOR 
Battalion Commander – Commander Company 2
Battalion Commander – Patrol 2-3
Battalion Commander – Patrol 3-3
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Comments 
The throughput of IERs remains on a high level for the 2.2 MANET, Scenario 2, 
movement within AOR. In comparison, when the nodes were fixed, the movement of 
nodes did not affect the connectivity or throughput. In comparison to the SINCGARS 
network in the same scenario, there is noticeable difference in level of throughput.  
3. MANET, Scenario 3, Extended AOR 
Network overview 
 
Figure 24.   2.3 MANET, Scenario 3, extended AOR 
Simulation parameters 
The simulation time for 2.3 MANET, Scenario 3, extended AOR, was set to 60 
minutes. Traffic was simulated by sending IER’s between the 13 nodes during the 
simulation time. The tactical force covers initially an area of 24 km * 21 km, which is 
equal to approximately 500 km2. Due to hostile actions outside the initial AOR, four of 
the units within the tactical force have to move south. The tactical force will, after this 
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movement, cover an area of 24 km * 27 km, which is equal to approximately 650 km2. 
The other nine units within the tactical force will be stationary. Communications with the 
highest priority in this scenario are the links between the Battalion Commander and the 
moving units, which corresponds to the following nodes: Commander Company 3, Patrol 
2.3, and Patrol 3.2.  
Results 
Overall IER average completion rate: 97% 
Statistic  Average  Maximum  Minimum  
Total Data IERs Completion Rate  0.97419  0.98130  0.00641  
Table 8.   Overall throughput for the 2.3 MANET, Scenario 3, extended AOR 
Performance for communications with the highest priority:  
Battalion Commander to Commander Company 3, Patrol 2-3, and Patrol 3-2 
 
Figure 25.   Throughput between nodes with high priority in 2.3 MANET, Scenario 3, 
extended AOR 
Battalion Commander – Commander Company 3
Battalion Commander – Patrol 2-3
Battalion Commander – Patrol 3-2
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Comments 
There are two major observations identified in 2.3 MANET, Scenario 3, extended 
AOR. The first observation is a decreased localized throughput to the nodes that acts in 
the added area. The second observation is that the overall throughput remains, on 
average, relatively high compared to the SINCGARS network in the same scenario. It 
seems that the MANET technology, where nodes act as relays between each other, will 
have an impact associated to the overall performance.  
H. UMTS NETWORK MODELING 
Network 3 will be based on civilian cellular technology. This network is built on 
3G/UMTS with an infrastructure based on towers. The backbone is formed by one base 
station and two repeaters on towers where the 3G subscribers are connected.  
 
UMTS Network 
Frequency range 1.9-2.1 GHz 
Output power Base-station: 20 W; Subscribers: 0.5 W  
Modulation/Spread Spectrum CDMA/DSSS 
Communication Protocol IP/TCP 
Simulated traffic in the network FTP using IP/TCP. Sending and receiving 
traffic (measured in bytes/sec) 
Table 9.   Data for UMTS Network model 
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1. UMTS Network, Scenario 1, Surveillance  
Network overview 
 
Figure 26.   3.1 UMTS Network, Scenario 1, surveillance  
Simulation parameters 
The simulation time for 3.1 UMTS Network, Scenario 1, surveillance, was set to 
60 minutes. Traffic was simulated by transmitting packets between the 13 nodes using 
FTP during the simulation time. The tactical force covers an area of 24 km * 21 km 
which is equal to approximately 500 km2. The 13 nodes are stationary and do not move in 
this scenario. Communications with the highest priority in this scenario are the links 






Overall performance:  
Statistic  Average  Maximum  Minimum  
Ftp Traffic Received (bytes/sec)  3,833.2  5,083.1  0.0  
Ftp Traffic Sent (bytes/sec)  3,863.2  5,016.0  0.0  
Table 10.   Overall throughput for the 3.1 UMTS Network, Scenario 1, surveillance 
Performance for communications with the highest priority: 
Battalion Commander to Commanders Company 1, Company 2 and Company 3. 
 
 
Figure 27.   Throughput between nodes with high priority in 3.1 UMTS Network,  
Scenario 1, surveillance 
 
Battalion Commander – Commander Company 1 
Battalion Commander – Commander Company 2 
Battalion Commander – Commander Company 3 
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Comments 
The throughput is on average considered to be relatively high in the 3.1 UMTS 
Network, Scenario 1, surveillance. When discussing data rate with subject matter experts 
at OPNET, a realistic value for data rate is 400 kbps in a UMTS network. In the 
simulation for Scenario 1, one of the priority links did not get any throughput at all. 
When moving the node away from the UMTS base station, the link could be re-
established. The observation was that the node initially was interfered with by other 
nodes when it was too close to the base station. The identified interference issue was 
discussed and confirmed by subject matter experts at OPNET.  
2. UMTS Network, Scenario 2, Movement within AOR 
Network overview 
 








The simulation time for 3.2 UMTS Network, Scenario 2, movement within AOR, 
was set to 60 minutes. Traffic was simulated by transmitting packets between the 13 
nodes using FTP during the simulation time. The tactical force covers an area of 24 km * 
21 km, which is equal to approximately 500 km2. Four of the units within the tactical 
force will move towards a location in the southwest part of the AOR where an incident 
has occurred. The other nine units within the tactical force will be stationary. 
Communications with the highest priority in this scenario are the links between the 
Battalion Commander and the moving units, which corresponds to the following nodes: 
Commander Company 2, Patrol 2.3, and Patrol 3.3.  
Results 
Overall performance:  
Statistic Average Maximum Minimum 
Ftp Traffic Received (bytes/sec)  3,926.2  5,249.8  0.0  
Ftp Traffic Sent (bytes/sec)  3,975.4  5,337.1  0.0  
Table 11.   Overall throughput for the 3.2 UMTS Network, Scenario 2, movement 
within AOR 
Performance for communications with the highest priority:  
Battalion Commander to Commander Company 2, Patrol 2-3, and Patrol 3-3.  
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Figure 29.   Throughput between nodes with high priority in 3.2 UMTS Network, 
Scenario 2, movement within AOR 
Comments 
The throughput for the 3.2 UMTS Network in Scenario 2, movement within 
AOR, remains high in an overall perspective. There is no interference from the base 
station to links with priority in this scenario. The interference that was identified for the 
UMTS network in the previous scenario 1 seems only to occur in a certain area and 





Battalion Commander – Commander Company 2
Battalion Commander – Patrol 2-3
Battalion Commander – Patrol 3-3
 65
3. UMTS Network, Scenario 3, Extended AOR 
Network overview 
 
Figure 30.   3.3 UMTS Network, Scenario 3, extended AOR 
Simulation parameters 
The simulation time for 3.3 UMTS Network, Scenario 3, extended AOR, was set 
to 60 minutes. Traffic was simulated by transmitting packets between the 13 nodes using 
FTP during the simulation time. The tactical force covers initially an area of 24 km * 21 
km, which is equal to approximately 500 km2. Due to hostile actions outside the initial 
AOR, four of the units within the tactical force have to move south. The tactical force 
will after this movement, cover an area of 24 km * 27 km, which is equal to 
approximately 650 km2. The other nine units within the tactical force will be stationary. 
Communications with the highest priority in this scenario are the links between the 
Battalion Commander and the moving units, which corresponds to the following nodes: 




Overall performance:  
Statistic  Average  Maximum  Minimum  
Ftp Traffic Received (bytes/sec)  4,039.1  4,818.9  0.0  
Ftp Traffic Sent (bytes/sec)  4,080.7  4,877.8  0.0  
Table 12.   Overall throughput for the 3.3 UMTS Network, Scenario 3, extended AOR 
Performance for communications with the highest priority:  
Battalion Commander to Commander Company 3, Patrol 2-3, and Patrol 3-2 
 
Figure 31.   Throughput between nodes with high priority in 3.3 UMTS Network,  
Scenario 3, extended AOR 
Comments 
The overall throughput remains high also for the 3.3 UMTS Network, Scenario 3, 
extended AOR. There is no interference from the base station to links with priority as 
Battalion Commander – Commander Company 3
Battalion Commander – Patrol 2-3
Battalion Commander – Patrol 3-2
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occurred in scenario 1. An overall observation for the UMTS Network was that there 
seems to be a distinct limit for connectivity between the base station and a subscriber. In 
the SINCGARS and the MANET Networks, a graceful degradation occurs when the links 
between nodes are extended. A similar graceful degradation of throughput effect could 
not be observed in the UMTS Network.   
I. OVERALL RESULTS FROM THE MODELING 
After modeling the networks, the following summary can be accomplished for the 
various network approaches.  
Comment: The throughput measurement is made by sending IERs in the MANET 
and the SINCGARS network. In the UMTS-model, the default measurement for 
throughput was done by transmitting data using FTP. Since there is a difference in the 
method of measurement between the networks, some uncertainties will occur when cross-
comparing values for throughput. The tabulated results are therefore based on how each 
network performed to the different scenarios (see Table 13).  
 
Scenario SINCGARS MANET UMTS 
1. Surveillance Overall high throughput 
within the network. 
Overall high throughput 
within the network.  
Overall high throughput 
within the network. 
Interference related to 
power management 
occurred for some 
nodes.   
2. Movement 
within AOR 
A decrease in the overall 
throughput was 
observed. The overall 
throughput is still 
considered as 
acceptable.  
Overall high throughput 
within the network, 
slightly decreased 
compared to the 
surveillance scenario. 
Overall high throughput 
within the network. 





A significant decrease in 
the overall throughput 
was observed. Low 
throughput for nodes 
acting in the added area. 
Decreased throughput 
for nodes acting in the 
added area. The overall 
throughput is still 
relatively high.  
Overall high throughput 
within the network. Low 
ability for graceful 
degradation is assessed 
for a UMTS network. 
Table 13.   Overall results from the modeling 
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V. COMPARATIVE EVALUATION AND DISCUSSION OF THE 
TECHNOLOGIES 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss, compare and evaluate ad hoc networking 
versus existing infrastructure-based systems. In order to discuss, compare and evaluate 
these technologies, results from the modeling and simulation in Chapter IV were 
combined with the information gathered from literature studies in Chapters II and III.  
A. CAPACITY 
The maximum theoretical rate at which data can be reliably transmitted 
over a given communication path, or channel, under given conditions is 
referred to as the channel capacity. [38]    
According to the modeling and simulation performed in this thesis, the result 
shows that a MANET, in general, can provide good throughput. An ad hoc network can 
be assessed to perform at a data rate to approximately 1 Mbps.  
The throughput that can be provided in a UMTS network should also be 
considered as high. The modeling and simulation shows that it is possible to achieve a 
data rate exceeding 400 kbps between a base station and a node. This level for the data 
rate in a UMTS network was also confirmed by a subject matter expert at OPNET [39].  
When comparing MANET to UMTS, it seems that a higher data rate can be 
provided in the MANET. In a further perspective, a future 4G system can be expected to 
provide a data rate that will equal, or even exceed, what can be achieved with a MANET 
solution. The modulation form Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM), 
which can provide a high data rate and handle many different types of users, is the 
preferred standard method for handling both 4G networks as well as in next-generation 
waveform development for military ad hoc networking such as the Wideband 
Networking Waveform (WNW).  
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B. MOBILITY AND FLEXIBILITY 
In this thesis project, the ability to move units within a given Area of 
Responsibility (AOR), maintaining a sufficient channel capacity, is referred to as 
mobility.  
In terms of providing a mobile and flexible network for a tactical force, both a 
MANET and an infrastructure-based system such as a UMTS network can obtain an 
acceptable solution. A MANET does not need to deploy towers and base stations, and can 
therefore provide an extremely flexible solution which can be rapidly deployed. Data 
rates are generally acceptable, and expected to improve in future implementations.  
According to the modeling and simulation in this thesis, a MANET supported a 
tactical movement within the required AOR without causing any significant decrease in 
the required throughput. When extending the AOR, as was observed in the simulations, 
there will be a significant throughput decrease to the nodes that act in the far extremes of 
the covered area. This phenomenon conforms to the basic idea for an ad hoc network. 
Since all nodes act as relay elements between each other, there have to be a certain 
amount of nodes covering the whole area in order to establish reliable connectivity 
between all nodes. Therefore, nodes have to be equally distributed throughout the AOR 
in order to establish good connectivity between nodes.  
A network based on UMTS technology requires significant and extensive 
infrastructure. This means that prior to the point in time when the network can first be 
used, an initialization phase has to be conducted, where base stations and towers are 
deployed and checked out. This resource requirement decreases the ability for the tactical 
force to immediately act when entering an AOR. Since one of the most important abilities 
in maneuver warfare is to maintain the initiative, this time delay can prove to be a severe 
limitation when using infrastructure-based systems. When the infrastructure is in-place, 
an UMTS network can be expected to provide valuable flexibility for the nodes that move 




transmission range, the connectivity rapidly decreases. In a scenario where the AOR 
needs to be extended, new base stations must be deployed. Alternatively, one could  
possibly regroup already deployed base stations.  
When comparing the two technologies, a MANET solution seems—from the 
author’s perspective—to provide the best flexibility and mobility for a tactical force. If 
the AOR is extended to the limits of the transmission range, it will certainly adversely 
affect the flexibility. Some nodes have to remain in certain positions in order to act as 
relays between other nodes. An infrastructure-based system requires a period of time to 
deploy all towers and base stations before the network can be used by the tactical force. 
When the infrastructure for a UMTS network is well in place, this solution can be 
expected to provide a sufficient flexibility within the AOR.  
From the author’s perspective, a combination of the two technologies could give 
the best support for both flexibility and mobility. A wireless system that is based on ad 
hoc networking, but enforced with some additional base stations, would give a solution 
that provides a high level of performance in terms of flexibility and mobility.  
C. ROBUSTNESS 
In this thesis project, robustness is referred to as the ability to maintain a 
sufficient channel capacity, under given conditions, when a communications system is 
affected by external factors such as jamming and physical manipulation.   
When conducting the modeling and simulation of the network technologies in this 
thesis project, it was not possible to test the simulations in a jammed environment. For 
example, when attempting to jam in the MANET simulation, the jammer did not provide 
the simulations for the expected effect and for the UMTS there was no jamming model 
available. The UMTS network uses CDMA as modulation in combination with a direct 
sequence spread-spectrum technique. With this configuration, the assumption that can be 
made for the UMTS network is that the modulation used provides some level of 
protection in terms of resistance against jamming. There is a risk though that those 
different nodes can interfere with each other since they all use the same frequency and 
PN sequence. This can cause network nodes to unintentionally jam each other. The power 
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management function in a distributed UMTS network is important in order to balance the 
output power and adequately support all nodes. If this is not done properly, the nodes will 
interfere with each other.  
Since it was not possible to simulate a relevant jamming scenario, the modeling 
and simulation effort could not provide a robustness result showing how the MANET 
responded to a jammed environment. Information about how ad hoc networking 
waveforms, such as Wideband Networking Waveform, respond to jamming has not been 
publicly released, and is therefore unavailable. The assumption made is that modern 
waveforms for ad hoc networking developed today contain some type of spread-spectrum 
technique that establishes a level of resistance against jamming. There are too many 
uncertainties to compare ad hoc networking versus infrastructure-based system in terms 
of resistance against jamming; therefore, no distinct conclusion can be made at this time.  
Network security is another important issue when discussing vulnerabilities in 
different types of technologies. The information that is required by the tactical force can 
be affected in the security aspects of availability, integrity and confidentiality.  
In ad hoc networking, all nodes have equal status, which means that the hierarchy 
for the level of security will be flat across the network. Every node will have equal 
vulnerability and therefore must be provided with the same level of security. If one node 
is compromised, the information in the network can be affected in almost all security 
aspects. Information can be denied and therefore not available for authorized users. Data 
can be manipulated and modified to affect the integrity of the information. Sensitive 
information can be revealed and thus, for example, affect the confidentiality of an 
operation. An ad hoc network therefore needs the presence of strong security mechanisms 
for the entire network. The first layer of protection should be to establish physical 
protection for the nodes to form a baseline for the overall protection of the network. In 
the next layer of protection, an Intrusion Detection/Prevention System (IDS/IPS) should 
be implemented in order to deny an intruder wireless access to the network.  
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An infrastructure-based system like UMTS is more centralized, and the 
vulnerability and the level of security will therefore not be equal across the entire 
network. The most vulnerable network elements will be the base stations. Because of 
their importance, the base stations in the network must be provided with especially strong 
physical protection. This means the tactical force resources have to be submitted to 
protect the base stations continuously. Similar to an ad hoc networking system, an 
infrastructure-based system must also be provided with IDS/IPS. However, due to the 
centralized hierarchy in an infrastructure-based system, the protection against wireless 
intrusion is probably less complex compared to a MANET.  
D. INTEROPERABILITY 
Interoperability is the ability of systems, units, or forces to provide data, 
information, materiel, and services to and accept the same from other 
systems, units, or forces and to use the data, information, materiel, and 
services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together. [40]  
The term interoperability has to be discussed from a broad perspective in order to 
take all aspects into consideration. In this thesis, the focus is on discussing the technical 
interoperability when comparing ad hoc networking versus infrastructure-based system.  
One of the objectives of the JTRS project in the United States and the GTRS 
project in Sweden was to develop a unified and “joint” approach for future wireless 
communications. Earlier developments had a “stove-piped” approach, where the Army, 
the Navy and the Air Force developed their own systems. This lack of cooperation 
between services resulted in limited interoperability, even between forces within the same 
nation. The mainstream plan for developing tactical wireless communications systems 
that most Western countries follow today is the software defined radio (SDR) approach 
with similar projects as JTRS and GTRS. These facts impact the perspective of 
interoperability. When most countries focus their development based on military 
exclusive SDR, it would be hard, in terms of interoperability, to go in any other direction 
and procure infrastructure-based civilian systems. In the framework of these military 
SDR-based projects, many countries develop waveforms that will support ad hoc 
networking, similar to the American Wideband Networking Waveform. At the same time, 
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the aspect of interoperability is more complex. Just because many countries have a 
similar approach and cooperate in SDR projects does not guarantee interoperability. 
There are many actors in this domain, some of them with strong economic and financial 
interests. It can be complicated to get all these actors to agree on standards and on their 
choice of technologies to ensure interoperability objectives are met.  
Since infrastructure-based systems are mainly developed for civilian networks 
and communications solutions, the interoperability with military systems is limited. 
Within the perspective of interoperability looking into today’s Peace Support Operations, 
there are many civilian actors that do not have exclusive military communications. The 
common base for cooperation and coordination between civilian actors and military 
forces could be an infrastructure-based system similar to the UMTS network used in this 
thesis project. Since cellular phone systems like 3G are so common in today’s society, 
and almost everybody is comfortable with this technology, there will be much common 
use and a resulting short startup time for training people.  
Comparing the ad hoc networking versus infrastructure-based systems in the 
perspective of interoperability, the ad hoc networking will be preferred. The SDR-based 
projects are the mainstream path for developing wireless communication for military use 
today. The author assumes that the standards used in civilian networks such as 3G and 4G 
can be implemented in the waveforms developed for JTRS and GTRS. A military force 
could then, in a Peace Support Operation, easily and conveniently switch to a 3G or 4G 
waveform if needed.  
E. COST AND ECONOMY 
Cost is a major factor to be considered when studying different tactical network 
solutions. In this thesis project, the cost perspectivewas not chosen to be the primary 
focus. However, the cost perspective is still a real-life issue and is therefore discussed. In 
order to make a comparison between ad hoc networking and infrastructure-based systems 
costs, information was gathered from the Swedish GTRS project and the Ericsson 
QuicLink system. When comparing these two, the results show that buying an 
infrastructure-based system like QuicLink seems to be a solution that is much less 
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expensive than procuring the Software Defined Radios through GTRS. The main reason 
GTRS is more expensive is that the development cost is included in the total cost. When 
comparing systems through an economic analysis, in a GTRS perspective, it is hard to set 
the limit of what should be included in the calculation of cost. As previously mentioned, 
the greatest impact of the cost calculation is most likely the cost for development, which 
is extremely difficult to characterize. When buying an existing system like QuicLink, the 
development cost will be shared between many actors. Since a system like QuicLink is 
based on existing 3G/UMTS technology, most of the development cost has already been 
funded. In contrast, when developing a unique military system like the JTRS or the 
GTRS, the cost for developing the system will not be shared by so many actors; most 
likely the sole actor will end up being the military community alone.  
In this thesis project, the author chose not to present any specific figures for the 
different communications solutions due to the complexity of which factors should be 
considered for calculating cost. The conclusion can still be made that it is much more 
expensive to develop a unique military software-defined radio system than it is to buy an 
existing civilian infrastructure-based communication system like QuicLink. This 
conclusion is based only on the initial development and procurement costs for a new 
communication system. No consideration was made for long-term sustainability 
according to maintenance and upgrades that would be involved for an existing system.  
Different technologies, in terms of mobility and flexibility, were previously 
discussed in this chapter. An infrastructure-based system has some limitations when it 
comes to mobility and flexibility, and requires a period of time to be operationally 
deployed. When the system is in place and operating, it can provide the PSO force a 
sufficient tactical solution. Earlier experiences from PSOs, for example in Kosovo, show 
that some operations can be very static and there is no need to move units over large 
areas. In the later part of the Kosovo operation, there has been a great increase of 
nonmilitary actors within the AOR who also need communications. In this type of 
scenario, which is more static, an infrastructure-based system like QuicLink could prove 
to be a cost-efficient communication solution. Another need for communications, which 
was not taken into consideration, is for management and welfare. To manage bases and 
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camps in an AOR requires communication. Soldiers who, for the moment, are not 
performing operations-related duty have to be provided with communications for morale 
and welfare. Communications for welfare and communications for managing camps and 
bases require no unique or sophisticated tactical abilities, so an infrastructure-based 
system could prove to be a highly cost-efficient and suitable solution.  
Developing a military-exclusive communication system from scratch is costly. 
This high expense is due to the need for the military to be leaders in the field, with a 
state-of-the-art systems that will satisfy all the unique and critical requirements the forces 
need to perform at the top of their ability on the battlefield.  
 77
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
A.  ANSWERS TO THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1.  Primary Research Question 
From a Swedish perspective, what are the key success factors for a tactical 
communications solution for a land-based battalion? 
To answer this question, the perspective must come from the basic principles for 
command and control in the Swedish Armed Forces, and how we want to conduct 
operations. The ruling principle for command and control in the Swedish Armed Forces 
is maneuver warfare. The key elements in maneuver warfare are initiative, tempo, and 
command and control by using mission-type tactics or directive control. A tactical 
communication solution must therefore support the commander and his/her tactical force 
and adapt to the basic principle of maneuver warfare. The key success factors for the 
tactical communication solution are the following.  
– Provide a sufficient capacity for voice, text, data, pictures and video. 
– Provide sufficient mobility and flexibility in order to meet the commanders need 
for keeping the initiative in any battlefield environment 
– Provide sufficient adaptability in order to meet the requirements for 
interoperability with different actors, both military and nonmilitary. A tactical 
communications system should also be adaptable in terms of upward compatibility with 






2.  Subsidiary Research Questions 
What are the key requirements for a tactical communications system?  
This thesis research identified the following key requirements based on a tactical 
force of battalion size.  
 Ability to connect up to 140 nodes 
 Provide a minimum data rate at 1 Mbps 
 Sustained operational capability (even during degraded service due to 
operations in hostile environment such as jamming, HPM and EMP) 




– Existing/available resources 
How does ad hoc networking compare to civilian infrastructure-based 
technologies? 
This thesis research shows that both ad hoc networking and infrastructure-based 
systems can serve as the baseline technology in a tactical wireless communication 
solution. The ad hoc networking in general is identified as the technology that best 
satisfies requirements, because the characteristics of the ad hoc networking technology 
make it highly flexible and mobile. An infrastructure-based system can also be seen as a 
cost-efficient alternative that can be useful in a more static battlefield.  
In this thesis project, the comparison between ad hoc networking versus 
infrastructure-based systems was based on simulations in JCSS/OPNET. The author 
would like to emphasize that the conclusions made are therefore based on results from 
these simulations and not from real-life, full-scale tests with hardware.   
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What recommendations from this study can be made to the Swedish Armed Forces 
for developing wireless communications systems beyond the ongoing Software Defined 
Radio Program (GTRS)?  
The path already taken by the Swedish Armed Forces—to develop software-
defined radios with ad hoc networking capabilities—seems to be the right choice of 
technology for now and in the near future.  
Since much of the development of modern military communication technology 
goes hand-in-hand with civilian sector developments, there are many similarities. 
Technologies developed for civilian use will be picked up in the future and used in 
military applications. An example is the Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing 
(OFDM) used in 4G systems. Due to its capacity for high data rate, it is also used for 
modern military ad hoc networking waveforms such as the Wideband Networking 
Waveform (WNW). Therefore, it should be an ongoing process for development of 
military communication systems to benchmark against and look into the civilian 
developments in communications technology.    
Developing a military-exclusive communication system is costly. At the same 
time, a battlefield environment can, in a worst-case scenario, have unique characteristics 
that require certain abilities for a communications system. The cost of developing 
military-exclusive communication capability is the price the military has to pay to be at 
the leading edge. Hopefully, these investments can pay off by making our fighting forces 
even more efficient on the battlefield.  
B.  CONCLUSIONS 
In this thesis project, the focus has been on comparing ad hoc networking systems 
with modern infrastructure-based systems in order to determine which system options 
will be the best technology for future tactical wireless communications solutions for the 
Swedish Armed Forces.  
As the first step in the thesis project, an analysis was accomplished concerning the 
requirements the Swedish Armed Forces have on their tactical communication systems. 
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In this context, a study into relevant national doctrinal, strategic and operational, 
documents was undertaken in order to better define the key requirements for a tactical 
communications system. These key requirements are based on how the tactical  
commander needs to command and control subordinated units. The doctrinal principle for 
command and control in the Swedish Armed Forces is maneuver warfare where the key 
elements are: 
– Initiative  
– Tempo 
– The use of mission type tactics or directive control  
In order to meet the principles for command and control for maneuver warfare, a 
tactical communications system must be flexible and support high mobility. The principle 
of using mission-type tactics or directive control requires a high volume of information 
flow within the tactical communications system. In terms of battlefield services, the 
tactical communications system should provide a sufficient capacity for voice, text, data, 
pictures and video. To handle all mission operations, including surge requirements, the 
tactical communication system also has to be secure and robust, and sustain operational 
capability even when presented with threat environments such as jamming, HPM and 
EMP. In today’s operations, the tactical force needs to cooperate with other services and 
with other units from different nations, thus requiring a high degree of interoperability. 
As previously mentioned, the tactical communication system needs to be flexible and 
adaptable. In an extended perspective of adaptability, a tactical system must also be 
upwardly compatible with emerging technologies.  
In the next step of the thesis research accomplished in this work, the available 
technologies for ad hoc networking and infrastructure-based system were analyzed. In the 
framework of JTRS and GTRS, waveforms are commonly developed to provide ad hoc 
networking for software-defined radios. The Wideband Networking Waveform (WNW) 
within JTRS and the Tactical Data Radio System (TDRS) within GTRS are both proven 
examples of waveforms with ad hoc networking capabilities that will be released in the 
near future. For infrastructure-based systems, the analysis focused on systems based on 
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3rd Generation Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (3G/UMTS) technology. 
An interesting infrastructure-based system that is operational today is the Ericsson 
QuicLink. The upcoming 4th Generation Long Term Evolution (4G/LTE) technology is 
interesting, but information about 4G/LTE for field use is currently limited.  
In the further analysis of ad hoc networking versus infrastructure-based systems, 
modeling and simulation scenarios were implemented using the software JCSS/OPNET. 
A tactical force of battalion size was modeled through three scenarios in the framework 
of a Peace Support Operation (PSO). When simulating ad hoc networking, a custom-
made model in JCSS/OPNET was developed, since no model was released for either 
WNW or TDRS. When simulating an infrastructure-based system, a model based on 
3G/UMTS was used. The result of the ad hoc networking simulation shows an overall 
high throughput for all three of these scenarios. The throughput decreased for the nodes 
furthest away when extending the communication to the limits of their intended coverage 
area. The result of the infrastructure-based system simulation shows a relatively high 
overall throughput in all scenarios. Some situations of interference were observed. This 
interference was caused primarily by operating components in the systems itself, which 
inadvertently jammed some of the subscribers. The location of the base stations for a 
distributed communications system is essential. This shows the importance of detailed 
planning when deploying an infrastructure-based system.  
As a final step in this thesis project, ad hoc networking was compared to 
infrastructure-based systems. When analyzing the different technologies in terms of 
capacity, the two technologies seem to perform equally. Using 4G/LTE technology in 
future infrastructure-based system can be expected to provide a high data rate.  
Analyzing the two technologies in terms of mobility and flexibility, the ad hoc 
networking is preferred. An infrastructure-based system needs a period of time to be 
established, which can affect the maneuverability if the operational tempo is high and 
requires large movements. On the other hand, if the operational scenario is more static, an 
infrastructure-based system can provide a feasible and robust solution that can provide 
sufficient flexibility within an AOR.  
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Most European countries follow the same path as Sweden, and develop software-
defined radios in similar projects, like the Swedish GTRS. Many other countries also 
develop ad hoc networking waveforms that will be used in their SDRs. Cooperation 
between projects will hopefully create common standards to enhance technical 
interoperability. Today’s PSO scenarios do not consist of military forces only. There will 
most likely be a significant number and types of nonmilitary actors in future PSOs that do 
not use military communications. These actors will use the existing infrastructure-based 
civilian communication systems in the AOR. This makes the term interoperability even 
more complex.  
When looking into the cost aspect of the two technologies, the infrastructure-
based system is in favor. It is a complex issue of what to include when calculating the 
cost for tactical communication system. The overall cost for SDRs within the GTRS 
project is high, because the cost for development is included in the calculation.     
The general conclusion when comparing ad hoc networking versus infrastructure 
systems is that the ad hoc networking approach best satisfies the identified requirements. 
The ad hoc networking provides a level of mobility and flexibility, which is important 
when conducting operations in a maneuver warfare approach. Maneuver warfare is a high 
priority for Swedish forces based on doctrinal preferences. An infrastructure-based 
system will most likely provide a cost-efficient communication solution in an 
operational/tactical scenario that is more static. An optimal solution would be to take the 
best of two worlds and make a hybrid system. Adding infrastructure in the form of base 
stations to an ad hoc networking tactical communication will provide an even higher 
flexibility, and further increase the robustness in the system. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
In this thesis project, the focal point has been on the battalion level as the tactical 
force. For future research, it could be both valuable and interesting to lower the 
perspective view and study the possible military use of infrastructure-based 
communications within forces smaller than a battalion. It could also be interesting to look 
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into the details associated with possible use for infrastructure-based systems to 
interconnect and effectively pull information from sensors.  
When the JCSS/OPNET models for WNW and TDRS are available, they could 
also be interesting for additional research. JCSS/OPNET is a useful tool to simulate 
communication solutions in different combat environments.  
When conducting the modeling and simulation in JCSS/OPNET for this thesis 
project, the default settings for measurements required the use of inconsistent network 
approaches. For future research, it could be interesting to investigate whether it would be 
possible to modify the JCSS/OPNET models for the actual network approaches in order 
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